The phenomenon of "dirty hands" is typically framed as an issue for normative or applied ethical consideration-for example, in debates between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, or in discussions of the morality of torture or political expediency. By contrast, this paper explores the metaethical dimensions of dirty-hands situations. First, empirically-informed arguments based on scenarios of moral dilemmas involving metaethical aspects of dirty hands are marshaled against the view that "ought implies can." Second, a version of moral realism is conjoined with a version of value-pluralism that charitably accommodates and explains the central features of the phenomenology related to dirty hands. It is not simply that agents are or are not justified in getting their hands dirty (les mains sales); rather, in certain situations, it is the nature of the moral domain itself to be intractably messy (le sale monde), such that dirty hands are unavoidable. The paper concludes by considering some important normative and psychological implications of this view.
Introduction
The phenomenon of "dirty hands" is frequently framed in the context of primarily normative considerations. In this way, the issue is typically analyzed by posing questions such as whether it is ever morally justified to perform an action which is ceteris paribus morally suspicious (if not downright impermissible) for the sake of bringing about a greater overall good. Thus, scenarios of dirty hands are useful "intuition-pumps" to probe the distinctions between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical frameworks.
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Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" For example, Utilitarianism might be motivated by a somber view of the necessity of getting one's hands dirty, whereas Kantianism might be expressed by reference to the corrupting nature of an over-willingness to compromise firm moral standards. Similarly, dirty-hands style thought-experiments are also often associated with particular scenarios in applied ethics-for example, in discussions of the ethics of torture, lying, war, capital punishment and abortion.
What has received mush less attention, by contrast, have been the metaethical implications of dirty hands. That is, what if anything do scenarios of dirty hands suggest about the nature of morality itself? The purpose of this paper is to explore the metaethical commitments implicit in such scenarios, and to lay out a metaethical theory capable of accommodating these commitments. Specifically, I will consider arguments that a charitable and empirically-informed look at the phenomenon of dirty hands undermines any strong version of the "ought-implies-can" precept. On the basis of such arguments, I
will defend a form of metaethical realism that I believe constitutes the best explanation of dirty hands. Ultimately, I argue for a "pluralistic" form of realism according to which some instances of dirty hands may be due to intractable moral dilemmas generated by mutually exclusive, but nonetheless realist moral values. If such a view is feasible, then an aspect of dirty hands which is usually attributed as a property of agents (les mains sales) can be reconceived as a property of a world that is itself morally dirty (le sale monde). privileged good need not be a moral good-as in situations in which someone tells a "white lie" in order to escape embarrassment, spies on someone solely for personal curiosity or voyeurism, or cheats on a test simply for expediency. In other words, these situations of dirty hands involve "cutting corners" with moral principles. I take it that the worry about this form of dirty hands is twofold: on the one (dirty) hand, an agent reasoning in such a manner is easily susceptible to a slippery-slope in which justifying increasingly egregious moral violations-"just this once"-becomes easier as desensitization and the psychological pressure to act consistently with previous actions build momentum. On the other (dirty) hand, there is a related worry that if the firm universality of moral principles is allowed to be sacrificed in any situation, it could easily be sacrificed in every situation on the basis of subjective, self-serving rationales. This form of moral dirty hands-namely, when an agent bends or breaks a moral consideration for the sake of a competing non-moral good-is surely a fascinating phenomenon that deserves serious attention; but it is primarily a psychological issue, not a metaethical one.
II. Varieties of Dirty Hands
Compare the above type of dirty-hands scenario with a situation in which an agent subverts a moral consideration for the sake of another moral consideration. For example, let us assume that not lying is an uncontroversial moral obligation ceteris paribus. It is easy to imagine a situation in which lying is the only mode of avoiding a greater moral evil-say, the suffering of ten innocent people. A common way to present the issue of dirty hands is as a conflict of just this sort: there are two moral considerations, each of which are ceteris paribus obligatory, but each of which is also mutually exclusive at a practical level. However, there is also a more basic anxiety generated by taking such fundamental moral dilemmas seriously-namely, that agents could find themselves in situations where they are morally responsible for unavoidable wrongdoing, which does not seem "fair."
This anxiety is closely connected to the familiar "ought-implies-can" principle, about which I shall have more to say in the subsequent section. Specifically, I shall argue that the application of the principle of charity to our actual moral experience provides strong warrant for mediating this commitment to fairness. For the present, though, the argument only requires the recognition that at least prima facie attention be given to apparent situations of incommensurable conflict as a datum requiring explanation. morally by subverting a moral consideration for the sake of a competing moral good that does not out-rank or override it, nor is out-ranked or overridden by it. Although this third type of situation raises a host of psychological and normative questions, it also uniquely raises metaethical issues. I turn to an analysis of such issues now.
III. "Dammit, Jim!"
A large part of the fascination with the sort of dirty hands that arise in Williams' and Sophie of course must either sacrifice her son Jan or her daughter Eva (or both).
Non-action is not a conceptually available option. These situations are, to borrow
William James' terminology, "living, forced, and momentous."
Examples of truly tragic scenarios of dirty hands are ubiquitous in literature and film. Of course, it may be the case that such dirty moral dilemmas capture our imagination in the way they do because they are (thankfully) rare occurrences in the everyday life of most people. For this reason, it might be objected that they are of questionable "ecological validity," representing unrealistic, romanticized, and sensationalized possibilities about which everyday agents have no clear or reliable intuitions at all. 10 Such reasoning, though, would fail to explain why the tragedies of Antigone and Sophie resonate as deeply as they do: why else would we return to tragedy unless it proffered a possibility or expressed an anxiety to which we could relate?
Furthermore, there may be compelling reason to believe that deep-rooted moral conflicts are more commonplace than many agents would like to acknowledge. For example, becoming cognizant of the challenges of global warming or world hunger will quite arguably engender a sensitivity to the tragic depth and real enormity of the issues. It may become difficult to see how we are not dirtying our hands any time we order an unnecessary appetizer for dinner or use gasoline while driving on vacation. It will matter not at all whether a Utilitarian tells him that he is required to kill the one to save the twenty, nor whether a Kantian tells him it is permissible to passively allow the twenty to die provided he does not violate the categorical imperative by actively killing the one; the situation has tragically forced Jim's hands to become dirtied no matter what he decides.
Indeed, we would regard Jim as morally deficient were he to calmly explain his reasoning in favor of either of the options by appealing to a normative theory that justified his decision, and then go confidently on his way with no feelings of guilt. In 9
Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" other words, it seems appropriate to say that were Jim not to feel as if his hands had been dirtied by his unavoidable participation in the encounter-even though he could not prevent it-it would reflect very poorly on his character. Williams himself has made a similar point about Jim's situation, and has stressed that it may be impossible for Jim to solve his dilemma "without remainder" in this way. 12 The difference between Williams' account and my own concerns how best to characterize the emotion that constitutes such a remainder. For Williams, this emotion is best described as a species of regret. However, this characterization appears insufficient since regret is an emotion that may be felt impersonally-that is, one need not feel personally responsible in order to regret that something is the case. 13 And it is precisely the personalization of moral dirtiness that I am arguing reflects positively on Jim's reaction to his dilemma. While I agree with Williams' insight that Jim is left with a "remainder," I argue that this emotional residue is best analyzed as guilt, which better captures the personalization requirement.
14 How people emotionally respond to situations where external states of affairs seem to conspire to force them to dirty their hands is often more important to our moral assessment of them than their particular actions themselves. 15 To appreciate this point, consider Jim's dilemma as expressed as an exclusive disjunction, where "A" abbreviates the option "kill one innocent person" and "B" abbreviates the option "let twenty innocent people be killed," such that:
Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" I argue that we morally admire those individuals most who respond in a personalized way to the disjunction itself, regardless of which specific disjunct they end up acting upon.
Whether Jim acts on "A" or acts on "B", he ought to (and probably will) feel morally bad about failing to act on the other option excluded by his choice. This is to say that Jim should feel bad because his hands are dirty regardless of how they became dirty or whether their being dirty was preventable. It will no doubt strike many as unfair that we should be this hard on Jim. After all, the fact that he is in such a plight in the first place seems a matter of arbitrary bad "moral luck." 16 And a deeply-rooted precept in normative theorizing is that agents can only be properly held morally accountable for actions that they have deliberative control over: the so-called "ought implies can" dictum. Counterfeit results were then given to the subjects falsely indicating that their brain activity had evidenced biased responses against black faces. Although this caused feelings of guilt in the subjects (who were of course debriefed after the conclusion of the experiment), when presented with opportunities to engage in prejudice-reducing activities (e.g. reading anti-bias educational literature or volunteering for racial-awareness events), they responded with greater than normal alacrity.
The Amodio study is a perfect expression of the type of tragic dilemmas that have metaethical relevance for dirty hands because a white individual need not be personally responsible for the actions about which he or she nonetheless feels guilty-he or she is placed in a tragic social environment of inherited racial privilege and may feel "guilty" about this even if he or she is not otherwise personally biased or prejudicial. In this way, as Bas van Fraassen has argued, tragic moral dilemmas embody a type of "original sin." officer, this exercise has been rigged as a tragic moral dilemma, expressible as the sort of exclusive disjunction described above. Whichever option she chooses, the training program will respond by rendering a morally unacceptable outcome: if she chooses to save the allied ship, her own crew will die and a war will be initiated; and if she chooses to abandon the allied ship, its crew will die. As in Williams' situation with Jim, the officer must get her hands dirty regardless of which option she chooses because the very nature of the exercise has been predetermined to be morally messy.
As James T. Kirk later makes clear, the exercise is less a test of what the officer should do-since, after all, she should perform each of the mutually exclusive actions, which is impossible-and is more an assessment of how she responds to the inevitability of getting her hands dirty. Of course, the officer understandingly continues to question not only her actual decision, but the very legitimacy of the tragic disjunction itself. The history of normative theory reveals a similar resistance in the form of continual attempts to identify some over-arching principle or value that could algorithmically ground a finite decision-procedure, capable of resolving any moral dilemma. Kirk's own actions (revealed later in the movie) embody a similar faith: he "solves" the Kobayashi Maru dilemma only by rewriting the program to allow for a single solution with no casualties.
This is a version of the familiar trope of the super-powered comic book hero who is able to perform both options in an exclusive disjunction which, for mere mortals, would be impossible.
I suspect that the reason why we relegate such fantastic resolutions of moral dilemmas to the realms of science fiction, fantasy, and comic books is because we recognize the fact that real-life is much messier than we would prefer. Captain Kirk and
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Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" other heroes of fiction can preserve the pristine cleanliness of their characters by utilizing the resources of their idealized worlds. The real world, by contrast, all too often forces us to get our hands dirty despite our best intentions and our most careful analyses. Whereas the fictional hero is great because he or she always finds a way to avoid dirty hands, realworld heroes are great when they respond in sensitive ways to the inescapable metaethical reality of dirty hands.
To summarize this section, it has been argued that certain moral dilemmas are uncomfortably ineliminable, such that agents cannot escape getting their hands dirty. The moral dirtiness of the world itself (le sale monde) is what tragically forces us to dirty our own hands (les mains sales). I have argued that this messiness in the moral domain cannot be eliminated or avoided despite very strong theoretic as well as existential pressure to do so, and that a certain sense of personal guilt in response to it is appropriate and praiseworthy (as well as motivationally efficacious). In the subsequent section, I turn to a more detailed discussion of a metaethical theory capable of accommodating this view of dirty hands.
IV. Filthy, Dirty Moral Realism
It might be thought that the simplest explanation of the moral messiness argued for in the previous section would be to embrace some version of metaethical relativism.
In other words, it could be that the reason why clean-cut moral distinctions and principles fail is because they represent interest-driven human conventions, constructed and projected onto the world to address particular cultural factors and challenges. Since these cultural factors and challenges will obviously vary between cultures, the respective
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Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" conventions and attitudes that arise as a result of them will ipso facto vary as well. Moral dilemmas, according to this line of reasoning, result from the conflict of one or more conventions which themselves arose for distinct purposes. 21 David Wong has provided an influential and powerful defense of a version of just such a view, which he calls "pluralistic moral relativism." 22 To motivate this view, Wong adopts a causal-historical theory of reference, according to which a statement's meaning is established by some initial "dubbing ceremony." Since different dubbing ceremonies will yield different meanings, reference transmission can thus result in a plurality of extensions for moral predicates. What is essential for Wong (in order to distinguish his sophisticated view from a cruder "anything-goes" relativism) is that this plurality of moral extensions is largely constrained by the conjunction of the coordinative function of morality with the biological nature of humans. Since there are only so many ways to successfully coordinate intra-and interpersonal conflict in consonance with our biological needs, the number of acceptable reference-fixing descriptions will not be infinite.
This is not the place to adequately assess the strengths and weaknesses of Wong's pluralistic moral relativism. Instead, I want to sketch an alternative understanding of the metaethics of moral dilemmas that is compatible with moral realism. Specifically, I want to defend a pluralistic moral realism that better accommodates the phenomenology of tragic dirty hands described in the previous section.
By "moral realism" I mean to refer to the view that: (1) moral statements are truth-apt (a.k.a. cognitivism); (2) at least some of these statements are in fact true; and (3) to say that a statement is "true" is to say that it bears a correspondence to features of the "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" world which exist independently of the evidence or beliefs of anyone (or of everyone, or even of epistemically idealized agents). I think this definition of moral realism is relatively uncontroversial and is non-committal with respect to more specific metaethical debates-such as the nature of moral knowledge, moral motivation, or even which moral propositions are actually the true ones. Note, though, that this definition does exclude as genuinely realist any view which interprets truth according to non-correspondence theories. Thus, for instance, sophisticated non-cognitivist accounts which preserve moral "truth" by reference to deflationary or minimalist theories of truth are not legitimate expressions of moral realism proper. 23 Of course, a fully satisfactory account of moral realism will need to specify these further commitments and defend realism from its numerous objections-viz. that it is metaphysically spooky, unable to articulate a parsimonious ontology of value, epistemologically quietistic, and unable to account for the practical/motivational role that morality is supposed to play. However, my purpose in this paper is not to defend moral realism per se, but simply to suggest that realism can best accommodate the phenomenology of dirty hands described above when it is conjoined with pluralism. Moral realism might prove unattractive for a host of other independent reasons, but a pluralistic form of it at least has the virtue of making sense of why we feel and act the way we do in situations of tragic moral dilemmas.
To further clarify, let us understand "pluralism" in a specifically ontological sense. This represents a departure from how "pluralism" is typically used in moral philosophy, which is in a normative sense-for instance, as a recommendation about how we should judge or act with respect to morally different practices. Such pluralists will be respectful of moral differences (to a certain extent) on a variety of normative grounds:
Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" perhaps because they believe that they are not epistemically justified in claiming to know which moral beliefs and practices are the right ones; or perhaps because they think that it is rude or even politically dangerous to insist on one single "right way." Though the specifics may vary quite a bit, it is typically in this normative sense that pluralism is discussed in ethics. 24 By contrast, ontological pluralism is less of a thesis about how we should live and act, and instead a thesis about what sorts of things exist. A moral version of ontological pluralism posits the existence of multiple moral values which cannot be conceptually reduced to one another, subsumed by any single higher-order value, or accommodated under any umbrella concept.
The conjunction of moral realism (as defined above) with an ontological pluralism of value has been a neglected option in metaethics. As we have seen, when pluralism is normally addressed, it is in a primarily normative sense. When pluralism is deployed ontologically-as by Wong, for instance-it is associated with metaethical relativism. According to pluralistic moral realism, though, there exists a multiplicity of nonetheless belief-independent values that are irreducible to one another. In this way, pluralistic moral realism would render the question that is often put to moral realists as to whether there is "a single moral value" misleading, conflating two distinct questions into one. Is there moral value? The pluralistic realist answers yes. Is this value singular? The pluralistic realist answers no. Thus, pluralistic moral realism acknowledges that the moral landscape might be messy and defiant of our desire to simplify it; and that it is anthropocentric hubris to think that moral reality must answer to our psychological need for parsimony.
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One initial worry regarding pluralistic realism is that it fails to adequately differentiate itself from the relativist alternative defended by Wong, and so should not be properly called realism at all. For how can we say that moral value is "real" To arrest this slippery-slope, pluralistic realism will need to provide some standard that recognizes only a constrained amount of fundamental values in a non-arbitrary way.
Fortunately, the pluralistic realist does not need to decide precisely which values are the real ones-although clearly a more detailed discussion of this issue would be necessary for a complete defense of the view. Indeed, a benefit of the realist position is that the proponent may assume a humble agnosticism about particular moral truths. For pluralistic realism is a thesis about the status of moral value, not necessarily about its content; the pluralistic realist claims only that there are belief-independent moral values, not that he or she necessarily knows what they are.
As for the worry that the plurality of moral values could slippery-slope into affirming so many values as to effectively affirm none, it is encouraging to observe that it has so far been unrealized. Empirical research in social psychology and cross-cultural anthropology have given at least some reassurance that the plurality of moral values is constrained to a small, finite handful. Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt have argued that experimental moral psychology is moving increasing toward an affirmation of pluralism. 26 Haidt has more recently collated fundamental values according to distinct "modules" and argues that different cultural practices and moral commitments seem generally be reducible to some combination or privileging of these basic values. 27 The specifics of such empirical arguments may be contested, and different anthropologists may gerrymander "modules" in somewhat different ways. But despite this, there are compelling hermeneutical reasons to assume that value-pluralism cannot vary radically, for the simple reason that we can understand most moral differences as I argue that this phenomenology of intractable moral dilemmas (and the attendant feelings of guilt) are important aspects of our moral consciousness that are worth preserving in a plausible metaethical theory. If this is the case, then pluralistic realism has prima facie support. This is not to say that pluralistic realism has any sort of monopoly on moral guilt. Relativism or other monistic varieties of realism can also account for experiences of guilt. However, on the one hand, relativism would provide no compelling explanation of why we experience tragic moral dilemmas in the objectively-generated way we do, i.e. why we would not simply write it off as a relic of convention. And monistic realism, on the other hand, would fail to account for why we feel that competing moral considerations cannot be ranked or systematized in a way that obviates the dilemma.
So to summarize the argument in this section, we have attempted to take seriously the apparent reality that certain moral dilemmas are such that we are forced by the world to dirty our hands. These scenarios are experienced as both objective and irresolvable,
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Kevin DeLapp "A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands" such that we even assess moral character on the basis of responses to this dirtiness. The under-appreciated conjunction of ontological pluralism with moral realism allows us to save and explain both these phenomena in a charitable way: we are forced to get our hands dirty when we are confronted with plural obligations which represent values that are equally real as well as practically inconsistent.
V. The Limits of Moral Hygiene: Living with Dirty Hands
The metaethical position described above presents us with a deeply unforgiving and messy moral universe. Negotiating such a chaotic terrain without sullying one's character by ever subverting a moral consideration will be either a matter of exceptional good luck or else exceptional moral blindness. What seems much more probable is that the vast majority of people are coerced into getting their hands dirty by inescapably subverting a moral consideration in some tragic dilemma. I have argued that this view has the following advantages: (1) it frames the phenomenon of dirty hands as a metaethical issue, and not merely a psychological or normative one; (2) it preserves and explains our intuitions about feeling guilty for not performing both options in an exclusive moral disjunction; and (3) it motivates an under-appreciated option in metaethical theory (viz.
pluralistic moral realism) which can charitably do justice to all these explananda.
In this section, I conclude by briefly suggesting other possible advantages of pluralistic moral realism and its understanding dirty hands. For one thing, we have already seen examples of how guilt-even guilt that flies in the face of the "ought implies can" precept-can be motivationally and behaviorally efficacious. Recall the Amodio study discussed earlier about the positive repercussions of inherited racial guilt.
Furthermore, guilt about failures to perform inconsistent actions might help stimulate us to act better morally in the future. For a life with no feelings of guilt could too easily be associated with the illusion of moral perfection-a life in which we rest on our moral laurels. If morality only requires of us what we can do, then we arguably lose incentive to increase our capacities for action. In other words, we may be tempted to be complacent, confident that we have met our "moral quotas."
The recognition of tragic dirty hands can also help instill in us a deeper sensitivity to the moral shortcomings of others. If situations of conflicting obligations reveal the difficulty (or even the practical impossibility) of moral perfection, it seems plausible that this could result in a feeling of solidarity since no one is morally perfect. Indeed, recall that for Aristotle, the katharsis of tragedy consists in a recognition that the tragic figure is both imperfect (thereby generating pity) as well as relevantly similar to one's self (thereby generating the fear that such a tragedy could befall one's self just as easily).
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The tragic situations of dirty hands explicated by pluralistic realism might offer an analogue to Aristotelian katharsis: we often feel a beneficial camaraderie when we recognize that others go through difficulties-even impossibly tragic dilemmas-just as we do. After all, this seems to be a large part of the reason why support-groups seem to function as well as they do.
To conclude, I have argued that the phenomenon of dirty hands raises significant metaethical questions in addition to the psychological, normative and political ones which are typically the focus of discussion. Specifically, the metaethics of taking dirtyhands scenarios seriously seems to be one in which the moral world itself is revealed as messy (le sale monde), forcing agents to dirty their hands in defiance of the "ought
